Article III. Section 3. Corruption of Blood
The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted. Article III, Section 3 of the U.S. Constitution Treason is a unique offense in the U.S. Constitution and it is the only crime expressly defined by the Constitution, and applied only to Americans who have betrayed the allegiance they are presumed to owe the United States. While the Constitution’s Framers shared the centuries-old view that all citizens owed a duty of loyalty to their country that was not their motivation for including the Treason Clause. Instead, it was included as a safeguard against the historic use of treason prosecutions by repressive governments to silence otherwise legitimate political opposition. Debate surrounding the Treason Clause at the Constitutional Convention was actually focused on ways to narrowly define the offense, and to protect against false prosecutions. The Constitution specifically identifies what constitutes treason against the US. It limits the offense of treason to only two forms of conduct: (1) “levying war” against the United States; or (2) “adhering to [the] enemies [of the United States], giving them aid and comfort.” There have not been many treason prosecutions in American history—only one person has been indicted for treason since 1954—the Supreme Court has had occasion to further define what each type of treason entails. The Constitutional Convention The Constitutional Convention debating the Treason Clause of Article III Section 3. Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court. The offense of “levying war” against the United States was interpreted narrowly in Ex Parte Bollman & Swarthout (1807), a case stemming from the infamous alleged plot led by former Vice President Aaron Burr to overthrow the American government in New Orleans. The Supreme Court dismissed charges of treason that had been brought against two of Burr’s associates—Bollman and Swarthout—on the grounds that their alleged conduct did not constitute levying war against the United States within the meaning of the Treason Clause. It was not enough, Chief Justice John Marshall’s opinion emphasized, merely to conspire “to subvert by force the government of our country” by recruiting troops, procuring maps, and drawing up plans. Conspiring to levy war was distinct from actually levying war. Rather, a person could be convicted of treason for levying war only if there was an “actual assemblage of men for the purpose of executing a treasonable design.” You’re not levying war against the U.S. until you actually fire the first shot or commit some act of war. Not even extensive planning that would normally satisfy any attempt statute in criminal law be enough. The Court explained the remaining treason offenses narrow application: “A citizen intellectually or emotionally may favor the enemy and harbor sympathies or convictions disloyal to this country’s policy or interest, but, so long as he commits no act of aid and comfort to the enemy, there is no treason. On the other hand, a citizen may take actions which do aid and comfort the enemy—making a speech critical of the government or opposing its measures, profiteering, striking in defense plants or essential work, and the hundred other things which impair our cohesion and diminish our strength—but if there is no adherence to the enemy in this, if there is no intent to betray, there is no treason.” See Cramer v. United States (1945). In other words, the Constitution requires both concrete action and an intent to betray the nation before a citizen can be convicted of treason; expressing traitorous thoughts or intentions alone does not suffice. Likewise, actions that do aid and comfort the enemy but were not taken for the purpose of or intention to do so cannot be considered treason either. Only an action taken with the intent of aiding the enemy that actually does serve to aid the enemy. The Constitution also narrowed the scope of punishment for treason as compared to English common law. The final clause of this Section establishes that, while Congress has the general power to establish the penalties for committing treason, Congress may not “work corruption of blood, or forfeiture except during the life of the person” convicted of treason. “Corruption of blood” is a reference to English common law, which prohibited family members from—among other things—receiving or inheriting property from a person convicted of treason. Under the Constitution, that punishment may not extend beyond the life of the person convicted of treason. The U.S. does not punish a man for the crimes of his father. The country has that doctrine deeply enshrined in its law from its very inception.